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Introduction 
The Save River catchment in eastern Zimbabwe comprises a physical space in 
which the waters of a large region are interconnected. In a physical sense, the 
Save catchment is therefore a 'real' entity. With the promulgation of the new 
Water Act of 1998 and the beginning of its implementation in 2000, the Save 
catchment also exists institutionally now: at least in the minds of some of the 
policy makers and other actors. In this spatial expanse, many more realities are 
enacted: geographically, socially, culturally, economically, and politically. But 
these realities are highly diverse and fragmented. 
In order to build networks and secure livelihoods, people have sought to 
combine in all manner of ways, the different resources (natural, material, 
technological, human, legal, institutional, financial) that occur in the Save 
expanse (see e.g. Roder, 1965; Campbell et al., 1989). A water use system for 
agriculture, for instance, involves one or more farmers consciously combining 
water (rainfall, river water, and groundwater) and land resources (soil particles, 
stones etc.) in a specific way. Such a system only works if tightly linked to other 
material resources, such as crops, fertiliser, pumps, siphons, electricity lines, 
documents (e.g. title deeds, water rights), court buildings, and of course money 
and account statements, and with other, less tangible resources such as unwritten 
rules, wisdom, knowledge and information flows. This network also links human 
actors, both as an intended strategy (e.g. a farmer dealing with an extension 
officer, a sales representative of a seed company, a Headman, etc.), but also 
unintentionally, since the water cycle itself links actors together (e.g. up- and 
downstream irrigators). 
A water use system can therefore be understood as an actor-network (Law, 
1994). Networks of human and non-human actors emerge around water use that 
have a sense of order, enabling actors to take further action, further ordering the 
networks and their environments in the process. Water-networks, as we will call 
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them in this paper, are therefore recursive, emergent forms. They cover 
different spans of space and time, and produce different outcomes in terms of 
(agricultural, industrial and mining) productivity, environmental sustainability 
and social equity. 
Zimbabwe's water reforms explicitly seek to address the (historically based) 
inequitable access to water that exists between the commercial and smallholder 
farming sectors. At the same time, it is an attempt to improve productivity and 
environmental sustainability of the water sector as a whole, while basing the 
entire project on a sound financial footing. The reforms are therefore aimed at 
fundamentally changing the existing water use systems and water-networks. 
Zimbabwe's water reforms exhibit quite a few characteristics of a top-down 
prescriptive process, drawing heavily on ideas from classic public administration 
and neo-institutional economics (North, 1990, Ostrom, 1992). The initial 
emphasis of the reforms has been on drafting new legal frameworks (Water Act 
1998 and Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) Act 1998) and crafting 
new institutions (ZINWA and Catchment Councils). It is then assumed that the 
planned implementation of new legal stipulations and operational rules, as well 
as the rational pursuance of new economic and normative incentives embodied in 
the new institutions, will result in the desired policy outcomes, i.e. re-
distribution, accountability, stakeholder participation and cost-efficiency. 
Long and Van der Ploeg (1989, 1994, 1995) criticise such a mechanical model 
of the relationship between policy formulation, implementation and outcomes. 
They argue in favour of a more process-oriented analysis of policy change by 
focusing on the capacity of social actors (i.e. water users and government 
personnel) to transform policy outcomes during implementation. Social actors 
actively pursue their own strategies and projects by drawing on existing 
knowledge, resources and capabilities, together with emergent organisational 
forms. Thus policy implementation, in this case, is conceived as an ongoing, 
socially constructed and negotiated process. A process that is contingent rather 
than planned. 
Whilst sharing a view that favours a process orientation, we nevertheless note 
that the above mentioned approaches overlook the material dimension of water 
use practices. In this paper we intend to overcome this lacuna by analysing 
several cases of water-networks in the Save river catchment that operate 
alongside and within the colonial state engineered water administration. We then 
try to extrapolate the findings and see whether or not the new legal and 
institutional reality would enable these water-networks to arrive at more 
productive, environmentally sustainable, and equitable practices of water use. 
Our main contention is that the existence and transformation of water-networks 
as found in Save catchment cannot be explained by focusing on legal and 
institutional incentives alone, nor by focusing exclusively on the agency and 
strategies of social actors engaged on the waterfront. It is critical that the material 
dimensions of water use practices are engaged, since they constitute an essential 
part of these practices. 
2
 Norman Long has likened the emergence of ordered forms to how ants build their hills. The deposit 
of clay by the first ant enables the next to position more clay: 'each deposit sets up a kind of sense 
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emerge!' [Norman Long, 17 December 1987, Autlân, Mexico] 
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Much of the case material used in this paper was collected earlier within the 
context of a research programme that was initiated by Norman Long. The paper 
attempts to synthesise some of these materials that were inspired by the actor-
oriented perspective developed by Norman Long (Long, 1984, 1989, 1990, 
1992). In the conclusion a plea is made to extend Long's actor-oriented approach 
by bringing in the material dimensions of water use practices, using the actor-
network perspective. Technology and material dimensions of social practices are 
constitutive elements of social intercourse, and not exogenous to it. 
Contrasts in the catchment 
The Save catchment in Zimbabwe (covering an area of 40,000 km2 before the 
confluence with the Runde River at the border with Mozambique) is a region of 
sharp contrasts. The lush, cool upper reaches of the catchment with its 
mountainous ecology (some 2,000 meters above sea level) differs markedly from 
the barren, dry and hot miombo woodlands lower down (500 m.a.s.1.). The high 
rainfall areas with 2,000 mm/yr are set against the dry areas that receive less than 
500 mm/yr on average and are subject to large annual rainfall variations. The 
urban settlements (such as Mutare) form a contrast to the pristine parks, which 
may be publicly owned (such as Chimanimani and Gonarezhou) or private (such 
as the Save Conservancy which is a joint venture between a number of 
commercial farms). The exotic tree plantations in the mountains differ greatly to 
the sugarcane plantations in the lowveld. The commercial farming areas look 
markedly better than the communal areas and importantly, people living under 
poor conditions with few assets and little access to basic services are juxtaposed 
against affluent farmers with light aircraft in their backyards. 
The catchment area has been 'scarred' by many interventions, some of which 
date back to the 1930s. These include the forced establishment of contour ridges 
in fields, the voluntary establishment of terraces in some places, the complete 
removal of trees from arable land upon recommendation of the agricultural 
extension agency, and the carving out of areas for exclusive commercial farming 
with the resulting creation of communal areas. Recently, large fenced private 
parks have been established, consolidating many commercial farms where nature 
is being produced for the tourist market. More recently still, the boundaries of 
these parks have been breached by people seeking land. And finally, dams, 
furrows and pipelines have been constructed (private, public, legal and illegal) 
with some of these pipelines even crossing the watershed, connecting catchment 
areas that were previously unconnected. 
These contrasting elements co-exist within the same physical space. The 
catchment knits water users together through the water cycle and the actors are 
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interdependent: the action of one person predicates upon another's, sometimes 
hundreds of kilometres downstream. 
Water-networks in the catchment 
People have developed a variety of strategies in order to cope with this 
interdependency. Some have embraced the formal legal-institutional set-up. 
Obtaining a water right for irrigation, in accordance with the Water Act of 1927 
(revised in 1976) requires that certain procedures be followed. An entire suite of 
actors and devices has to be enrolled. For instance, a report would be required 
from a hydrologist from the Department of Water Development to ascertain 
whether the water applied for is available. A report from the agricultural 
extension officer in the Ministry of Agriculture would be required to assess the 
viability of the soils, the crops to be irrigated, as well as the volume of water 
required. The construction of canals, gauging weirs and often the building of a 
storage reservoir might be necessary. This again involves engineers who can 
produce designs adhering to dam safety regulations. In order to construct the 
required works, the applicant would have to mobilise funds with commercial 
banks, and most likely attempt to access highly concessionary loans from the 
farm investment fund, requiring a business plan indicating the market 
opportunities for the intended produce. In all, to obtain and exercise a water right 
and for a water-network to function, an actor would have to enrol a host of 
physical devices, monetary resources, legal documents and human actors. This 
assemblage of mobilised resources can be understood as a water-network, which, 
if successful, would prove a highly profitable alliance. Often, then, such a 
network was stabilised and sustained over time, and could subsequently be 
drawn upon for even more ambitious projects. 
However, formally recognised water projects in the communal farming sector 
often followed a different route. Here, projects such as smallholder irrigation 
schemes were parachuted from the centre. Staff from the Department of Native 
Agriculture would closely supervise and prescribe the operations of the carefully 
selected irrigators or so-called 'plotholders'. Staff of the Department of Water 
Development would be in charge of supplying water to the scheme, whereas the 
agricultural staff would supervise water distribution and irrigated production. In 
this set up, the assemblage of resources that a plotholder had to manage was no 
less complex than that of a commercial water right holder, and often more 
unpredictable because of unreliable water supplies, distant markets and 
unscrupulous middlemen or monopolistic marketing boards. Plotholders would 
have to play the game of submission, while exploring the margins of the 
possible. They would also have to deal simultaneously with competing fellow 
irrigators. 
For the majority of communal farmers, irrigation was but a pipe dream. They 
had to cunningly deal with the capriciousness of the rains. For them, however, it 
was not enough to appease and anticipate the forces governing the rain. They 
also had to contend with outside institutions, rules, regulations and enforcement 
officers who spoke the language of conservation. For state actors, conservation 
became a key justification for intervention (Anderson, 1984: 327; Beinart, 1984). 
The colonial command-and-control discourse found fertile ground here and a 
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complex set of legal, institutional and technical prescriptions were designed in an 
attempt to harness the behaviour of the communal farms. The Natural Resources 
Board was established and the Natural Resources Act of 1941 was promulgated. 
An army of NRB officers were enlisted to enforce the Act by prohibiting stream-
bank cultivation and imposing penalties, while Land Development Officers 
forced farmers to construct contour ridges. Research stations mushroomed where 
soil erosion was quantified and extrapolated and an entire suite of state actors 
and new scientific insights and technologies were unleashed on the communal 
areas. What strategic response could have been provoked in this environment, 
other than synchronised sabotage? 
Despite strong legal backing and the mobilisation of various technological and 
financial resources to monitor and evaluate conservation and water use, the 
resultant state-engineered water-networks proved not to be durable in the 
communal sector. Enforcement proved difficult, because the interventions 
justified by these self-referral water-networks, lacked legitimacy. In response, 
counter-discourses developed resulting in the emergence of various 'informal' 
water-networks that challenged the legitimacy of the command and control 
network that was in place. 
After independence, and more particularly, after the adoption of neo-liberal 
structural adjustment policies, a need for change was felt in a number of areas 
that had facilitated reforms in the water sector since 1998. Concerns of equity 
and cost-recovery, as well as the need to include the non-commercial sectors in 
the decision-making process, led to the adoption of a new Water Act in 1998. A 
new institutional reality was thus created, with the establishment of catchment 
councils in which all water users were represented, to take joint responsibility for 
water allocation and the issuing of water permits. 
This paper describes five cases of water-networks. The first focuses on rainfed 
agriculture, capturing rainfall on marginal lands. The second deals with a farmer-
managed irrigation scheme where networks follow royalty and crop contracts. 
The third case looks at the competing claims of water between formal and 
informal small-scale irrigators. The fourth case shifts attention to competing 
claims between large and small operators. The first four cases are all set in 
Chimanimani district in Eastern Zimbabwe. The fifth case concerns a large water 
supply scheme for Mutare City. The diversity of the cases presented allows us to 
draw some generalised conclusions on water-networks, what they consist of, how 
they tend to operate and what this means for administrative reform. 
Stones and rainfall on the hills in Biriwiri (Van der Zaag, 2001) 
Biriwiri is a small valley in Chimanimani district, where from time immemorial 
people have used the waters of the Biriwiri River, a small tributary of the 
Nyanyadzi River that flows into the Save. They have used it for domestic 
purposes and for cultivating crops, on ridges along the riverbed or with the use of 
irrigation furrows. However, most communal farmers do not have access to river 
water to irrigate their crops, since their plots are located on the steep hills, away 
from the river. These farmers use rainwater instead to raise their maize, beans, 
pumpkins and other crops. 
What is special about the Biriwiri hill farmers, compared to most other small-
scale farmers in Zimbabwe, is that they have eked out their farming plots on hill 
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slopes which are considered, by the agricultural extension service, as being too 
steep and unsuitable for arable agriculture. To cultivate the steep slopes farmers 
have developed stonewalled terraces. 
The Biriwiri terraces form almost level mini-catchment areas where rainwater 
is captured for the cultivation of crops. The way in which the stone walls are laid 
out implies that soil erosion is minimised, even on the steepest cultivated hills 
(steeper than 20%). They allow a form of permanent agriculture, and most 
terraced plots are cultivated each year. Farmers manure their fields annually and 
intercrop maize with beans. Farmers also believe that the terraced fields have an 
internal source of nutrients that sustain yields: while planting the seed with the 
hoe, stones that seem to 'grow' to the surface are removed and thrown upon the 
walls, the soil below being 'virgin' and nutrient-rich. 
The terraces were developed in the early 1950s when the colonial state began 
to enforce the Land Husbandry Act and tried to implement contour ridges on the 
cultivated fields in the Biriwiri valley plain. This proved difficult because of the 
many stones in the fields. As a compromise, farmers were encouraged to lay the 
stones along properly pegged contours, forcing farmers to plough along the 
contour. Gradually, pronounced terraces developed. Local farmers soon found 
that such terraces were extremely suitable for the cultivation of the much steeper 
hillsides, rendering more land for arable use. This was a welcome discovery, 
because more and more people were continuing to arrive in the Biriwiri area, 
thrown out of nearby Melsetter Intensive Conservation Area but refusing to be 
resettled in the lowveld. Farmers (knowing that the cultivation of lands steeper 
than 12° was prohibited) will emphatically point out to outsiders that their 
terraces have been properly laid out by the mudhomeni, or extension workers, 
thereby implying that they are officially approved. The technology spread 
quickly and was adopted by new farmers coming into the area. At present, most 
hills in Biriwiri are terraced, and new terraces are still being constructed. 
The development of the bench terrace technology, in which the farmers played 
a decisive role, facilitated the emergence of a durable network between farmers, 
soils and stones. The technology has proven capable of capturing rainwater 
whilst mediating the potentially destructive effects of heavy rainfall on steep 
slopes. Its downstream effects are therefore limited. Because the water-network 
captures rainwater rather than water flowing in rivers, its 'span' is limited, as it 
does not have to mediate with upstream and downstream users. It is has also 
been proven to be durable: some fields have remained productive for a period of 
some 50 years. Another reason for its durability is that male and female farmers 
have been willing to invest enormous amounts of labour in the construction and 
maintenance of their terraces. This is especially revealing, since the tenure of 
these arable plots is, at least on paper, insecure because of the prohibition to 
cultivate steep hillsides. Acknowledging the local headmen and chief, and asking 
permission for the clearing of new fields, is therefore carefully observed. 
Networked water distribution in Mutambara irrigation scheme (Manzungu, 
1999b) 
Mutambara irrigation scheme irrigates 145 hectares with water diverted from the 
Umvumvumvu River, gravitating into the canals and furrows. The scheme was 
started in 1912 by a group of farmers who copied what was happening in the 
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nearby Mutambara Mission (Rukuni, 1988). The scheme was taken over by the 
colonial government in 1936, and government control continued until 1974 when 
the scheme was closed on account of farmer resistance to the colonial 
administrators. In 1980 the scheme was re-opened as a community-managed 
scheme. 
Water access in Mutambara irrigation is heavily influenced by the socio-
history of the scheme. The present scheme is the result of a fusion of two 
different irrigation initiatives (Manzungu, 1995, 1999b). Thanks to well meaning 
but ignorant (of the social organisation of the people) colonial authorities, this 
brought together feuding communities. As a consequence the down-stream 
irrigation blocks suffer incessant water shortages, even in years with normal 
water availability. 
Water distribution in Mutambara cannot be discussed about without reference 
to the Chief of the Mutambara dynasty. The scheme is regarded as belonging to 
the Chief, since he is believed to have started the scheme: a claim which is not 
backed by archival records (Manzungu, 1999b). A lack of archival evidence 
however has not stopped the Chief and his associates from monopolising water 
access. Indeed, water tends to follow people with royal connections. Interestingly 
enough, the royal circle tends to shrink when there is a severe water crisis, as 
was the case during the drought of 1994, when the inner royalty completely 
monopolised the water. The dominance of the Chief and his associates regarding 
water access is point of contention and is contested. There have been cases where 
the hegemony has been challenged by a combination of technological, 
hydrological, legal and commercial factors. 
Mutambara irrigation scheme has a history of growing crops like tomato and 
peas under contract to canning factories in Mutare town, 75 km away from the 
scheme. This is a lucrative activity that every farmer hopes to be part of but 
many changes have occurred since the early 1980s when contract farming 
started. Initially, the contract crop was grown under the auspices of a single 
'club' representing a group of farmers who marketed the crop together. In 1996 
there were 11 such clubs and in 2001 as many as 24 (Wiskapu, 2001). 
The proliferation of clubs is financially related. Each club signs a contract with 
the company. The contract has to be respected by all club members, and this is 
achieved through social control. Social control is important because side 
marketing of the contract crop results in a particular group or club being 
penalised by the company. A common penalty is that the club in question will 
not receive seed the following season. Farmers now prefer smaller groups, where 
social control can be more effectively exercised. 
These clubs are more than just marketing clubs. They are also a way of 
distributing water. The contract crop tends to receive preference during 
irrigation. Thus securing seed for the tomato crop secures irrigation water. Even 
members of the royalty have to play the game and place themselves within these 
structures of clubs if they are to grow the contract crop. 
In years with less than normal rainfall, most farmers find it difficult to secure 
access to irrigation water. When faced with a wilting crop, farmers sometimes 
visit their holdings to irrigate their crops without permission in the middle of the 
night. Such thefts tend to go unpunished because of the general breakdown of the 
spirit of social organisation among the irrigators. A permissive infrastructure 
helps in the sense that water flows throughout the system all the time and the 
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numerous leakages make water diversion easy. No-one can with any certainty 
know how much water goes where. The relatively low operation and 
maintenance costs means that the Chief can afford to ignore the other irrigators. 
This would be different if, for instance, the scheme depended on pumped 
irrigation water. In such cases, regular bills (of electricity or diesel) would have 
to be paid, and technology would be forcing some solidarity amongst irrigators. 
The way water is shared in Mutambara irrigation scheme shows how farmers 
depend on a number of elements that they combine in particular ways forming 
different water-networks. For a start, we can safely say that rules are seldom 
adhered to. In fact the rules only deliver water when things are 'normal', which 
is very rarely. Farmers therefore take strategic action to secure water, using and 
constructing different networks such as the royalty and the 'marketing' clubs. 
The networks are comprised of many heterogeneous physical elements such as 
technology, investment, maintenance (infrastructure), hydrology and climate 
which all bring into focus the water source, water availability, the delivery 
infrastructure, and crops. These are combined or re-configured to ensure water 
access. Thus a drying Umvumvumvu river in Mutambara demands that water-
networks be re-defined: they may 'shrink' as royalty is re-defined; but expand to 
outside companies whereby the commercial route emerges as an effective 
instrument to access water, circumventing royal claims. In addition, marketing 
clubs proliferate due to increasing distrust among irrigators. The water-networks 
also extend beyond the scheme level: in times of low river flows, Mutambara 
irrigators disclaim the entitlements of upstream irrigators using whatever 
arguments are convenient (Manzungu, 1999a). These include legal arguments, 
referring to statutory ('they do not have a water right') or customary law ('the 
Mission does not own the land, which was given by the Chief, therefore the 
water it uses is ours'). 
Competing for Nyanyadzi river water (Bolding et al, 1996, Bolding 1999) 
The Nyanyadzi River flows from its origins in the Eastern Highlands of 
Chimanimani district westward into the Odzi River, which in turn flows into the 
Save river. The Nyanyadzi and its main tributaries, the Shinja, Biriwiri and 
Makwe streams, collect water from a catchment area of 800 km2. On its descent 
the river passes through extensively used large scale commercial farmlands, 
resettlement and communal areas respectively, flowing from a lush, high rainfall 
area (1200 mm of rain annually) into the dry, sparsely vegetated lowveld 
(receiving 400 mm/yr). At its downstream boundary a government managed 
smallholder irrigation project (Nyanyadzi, started in 1934) depends on water 
captured upstream to irrigate the 414 hectares serviced by its open canal system. 
The river has presented two pressing problems. Firstly, its flow tends to decrease 
to a trickle during the crucial dry season months. Secondly, it tends to deposit 
increasing amounts of silt in the Nyanyadzi project, choking its diversion weir, 
main canal and night storage dam. These changes in the river's behaviour pose a 
threat to the sustained operation of the project, and are attributed by the irrigators 
to developments upstream. Many farmer initiated irrigation furrows have been 
developed across the catchment and compete with the Nyanyadzi project for 
scarce river water. Other land users have opened up new tracts of land on steep 
hills and in the close vicinity of riverbeds, thus adding a flavour of silt to the 
264 
river's storm floods. Furthermore rain clouds nowadays appear to avoid some of 
the upper reaches of the catchment, resulting in declining rainfall. Droughts have 
seemed to occur more frequently during the last 20 years. This has made land 
users in the catchment even keener to enter into a productive engagement with 
the river, thus increasing competition over valuable water. 
Various networks have emerged in the catchment, responding to the scarcity of 
water, by mobilising different combinations of infrastructure, land use practices, 
water sharing arrangements, local authority and legal claims. This case discusses 
two such water-networks that have emerged within the same catchment. The 
integrated land and water management practices of informal furrow irrigators 
upstream are contrasted with the attempts of Nyanyadzi irrigation project 
beneficiaries to realise their legal claim on river water. During times of water 
scarcity Nyanyadzi irrigators literally bring the water of the river to their intake, 
through organised upstream raids destroying intakes of competing irrigation 
furrows. 
Irrigation development in the Nyanyadzi catchment may date back to pre-
colonial times, but major developments started early in the 20th century. White 
settlers took out furrows, and farm labourers, tenant farmers and communal 
farmers soon followed this example. The government began the Nyanyadzi 
irrigation project in 1934. By 1938 it had already been discovered that upstream 
African furrows competed for water with the Nyanyadzi project. The 
government used the Water Act and Natural Resources Act to squash indigenous 
irrigation furrows and to declare the wetland cultivation practice of matoro 
illegal. It was believed that informal furrows were wasting water, and that 
wetland cultivation was destructive, causing siltation. 
As the water and agricultural administrative bureaucracy grew in terms of 
staff, offices and legal instruments, the Water Act and its stipulations had, during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, become a reality to the white settler furrows as 
well. The settlers applied for water rights on mass. In 1952 the Water Court sent 
a team of engineers to investigate the hydrological behaviour of the river (when 
the first discharge measurements are conducted) and assess the irrigation 
practices and plans of the white settlers. Again unauthorised African furrows 
were declared illegal. In addition, the priority right of Nyanyadzi project was 
made subservient to the upstream water rights of European farms with a more 
recent priority. Whilst the water administration established a semblance of rigid 
order (issuing absolute volumes of water, relying on self monitoring of water 
abstraction by users with help of measuring devices), Nyanyadzi river water and 
its users did not comply to this order. In the mountainous upper reaches of the 
catchment, irrigation continued without water rights and measuring devices. The 
emerging water-network controlling and regulating Nyanyadzi river water did 
not reach that far. 
In 1967 a network of 5 automatic gauging stations was installed to 'calibrate' 
the decisions of the Water Court with the empirical hydrological behaviour of the 
river. The immediate necessity for these measuring devices was the possible 
construction of a dam on the Nyanyadzi River, which would alleviate water 
shortages in the Nyanyadzi project and allow further expansion of irrigation in 
the lowveld. 
During the late 1970s, at the peak of the liberation war, groups of labour 
tenants and land hungry communal farmers invaded the empty farms in the 
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middle range of the catchment and started using the irrigation furrows as well as 
taking out new furrows. The spatial set-up of these furrows respected the local 
hydrology. Their management was often mediated by a headman, using the 
principle of sharing of water during scarcity by means of taking turns, and 
remaining outside government control. 
Water rights were of no concern, until 1983 when the administration was on its 
feet again. The District Administrator applied for water rights on behalf of many 
new furrow irrigators in Shinja resettlement scheme and the downstream 
communal areas. Thus, Nyanyadzi river water was increasingly committed to 
these water rights, and users were more frequently confronted with water 
shortages. During such times of water scarcity, the sole river inspector for the 
entire province of Manicaland could do very little to effect the priority date 
system of water rights. 
In effect, water administration follows the irrigation practices on the ground, 
rather than the other way round. The Water Act, staff from the Department of 
Water Development, and flow gauges seem powerless to control and regulate 
water use. This is evidenced by the fact that more water rights have been issued 
than the river can deliver in critical dry seasons. V-notch measurement gauges 
that have been installed at the intakes of some furrows are used as symbols of 
legality rather than for measuring water abstraction. The official state-engineered 
water-network surrounding water use is authoritarian but weak, particularly 
during times of water scarcity. 
Due to the upstream developments of informal irrigation furrows, plotholders 
in Nyanyadzi irrigation project are faced with frequent water shortages. The 
water administration, however, fails to find a suitable and lasting solution. Hence 
the plotholders and the project's management have no other option than to take 
the initiative. They organise raids up the river, destroying the diversion structures 
of the numerous informal furrows. But the raids have been futile: the effect is 
minimal in terms of water reaching the project, and the destructive raids are 
opposed by politicians and extension workers in the middle range of the 
catchment. The District Administrator has twice brokered a 'fair' water sharing 
arrangement between the informal and formal irrigators, but these arrangements 
have proven to be unstable. The deal was that the upstream furrows along the 
Nyanyadzi River and the Nyanyadzi irrigation project would open and close their 
intakes on alternate weeks, in this way giving each other equal access to 
irrigation water. The DA deployed principles of 'sharing' water in a 'fair' 
manner. Both principles seem to have been derived from the way the informal 
furrows were being managed in practice, and not from the Water Act of 1976. In 
fact, 'water sharing' and 'fairness' are concepts foreign to the Water Act, which 
has been based on an entirely different principle, namely the priority date system. 
However, the water that left the Nyanyadzi in this arrangement never reached the 
project intake: the water percolated and evaporated on its way down through the 
dry riverbed. Consequently, the Nyanyadzi project could not be made to co-
operate in this deal. However fair the deal was, it had to fall through. 
Interestingly, the new Water Act of 1998 abolished this priority system of 
water rights, and based itself on principles of equity and proportional allocation. 
The new Water Act has also established catchment councils constituted by 
representatives of all water users, who jointly decide on water allocation. The 
question is whether these legal and institutional innovations are sufficient to 
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resolve the water conflicts in the Nyanyadzi catchment in a more acceptable and 
negotiated manner, bridging the gap between legality and practice, and 
interconnecting the various water-networks. One thing is certain: the new 
structure will not produce more water or change the characteristics of the 
riverbed, and shortages are bound to continue. Additional changes will have to 
be made on the material elements of the existing water-networks, so that 
diversion weirs, furrows and canals are better tailored to the fluctuating flows 
and silt loads of Nyanyadzi River. 
Trees and irrigators competing for water and land in Chimanimani 
The case of competition for water between a transnational forestry company, 
Border Timbers (a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corporation), and farm 
labourers engaged in 'informal' furrow irrigation, is set in the Nyanyadzi river 
catchment, Chimanimani district. The Nyanyadzi irrigation project (the 
government-managed scheme mentioned in the previous section) also features in 
the background of this case. 
The story starts with white settlers of the Martin trek (1895) carving out large 
farms in the upper and middle range of Nyanyadzi catchment. In this process, 
resident African families became farm labourers. The farms were mainly used 
for cattle ranching, but irrigation infrastructure was also developed for 
horticulture. However, the area was affected by the liberation war in the 1970s. 
By 1978 only eight of a total of 105 farms in Cashel and Chimanimani were still 
occupied by their white owners (Alexander, 1993: 247-48). The rest of them had 
either been killed or had fled from the freedom fighters infiltrating the area from 
nearby Mozambique. 
This set the scene for John Heynes, one of the few remaining white farmers 
and chairman of the Cashel Rural Council, to expand his cattle ranching 
operations to a network of farms which by the end of the 1980s numbered some 
80 farms in Chimanimani and his native Makoni district. Heynes was locally 
known as Masoori for his propensity to make farm labourers sorry by using his 
sjambok. Heynes took care of many farms that had been abandoned by their 
white owners during the war. He put cattle on these farms and employed local 
baasboys and some tenant labourers to look after his steadily growing herd. 
After Independence, Heynes and his Hangani Development Corporation (over 
7,000 hectares on six farms in the upper Nyanyadzi catchment) did very well 
economically (mainly cattle ranching). Meanwhile, the government had started 
the land resettlement programme. Farms designated by the government for 
resettlement were invaded by more and more settlers from neighbouring 
overcrowded communal areas. The new squatters managed to make a living by, 
amongst other activities, taking out irrigation furrows and entering into lucrative 
tomato and pea-growing contracts with Mutare based canning factories. The 
Squatter Control Committee of Chimanimani, however, issued alarming reports 
on the environmental destruction caused by these squatters, but failed to provide 
an alternative in the absence of more resettlement farms. 
In 1995 Heynes decided to sell his Hangani development corporation farms. 
Border Timbers, the local commercial forestry company and biggest employer of 
5
 This section is based on unpublished material collected by Alex Bolding. 
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Chimanimani district, expressed interest in these farms, which would enable it to 
expand operations for the planned chipboard factory in a joint venture with 
Mozambican investors. In January 1996 a team of officials from the Department 
of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex) assessed the farms 
for sale on their suitability for resettlement. The team considered all farms 
unsuitable for resettlement, since they were too steep and hilly for arable farming 
- this was despite the presence of numerous irrigation furrows on these farms 
operated by farm foremen and tenant labourers. Subsequently, Border Timbers 
hired a consultant to conduct an environmental impact assessment on the planned 
afforestation, eco-tourism and wildlife ranch developments. In July 1996, the 
Rural District Council was briefed by the consultant that the afforestation with 
pine trees (90%) and blue gums (10%) would be done in an environmentally 
friendly manner, such that the trees would have a next to minimal affect on the 
run-off of the Nyanyadzi river. 
In September 1996 a University of Zimbabwe researcher and a Chimanimani 
Rural District Councillor informed downstream irrigators of the imminent land 
transfer and afforestation plans, which could affect their already limited access to 
water.6 Most furrow irrigators are keenly aware of the effects of exotic tree 
plantations on the hydrology of their river. The Zimbabwe Farmers Union in 
Nyanyadzi irrigation project also expressed displeasure with the Border Timber 
deal, but failed to mobilise its members effectively. Border Timbers hired 
another consulting company from South Africa for a second EIA, which 
projected a 10% reduction of mean annual run-off 12 years after the start of 
afforestation. The Managing Director of Border Timbers, however, claimed that 
the run-off might even increase due to a phenomenon called 'mist entrapment' 
by pine trees. Economic arguments (trees are the most productive use of land), 
environmental arguments (resettlement can only lead to degradation of valuable 
resources, wildlife ranching enriches local biodiversity), as well as a newly 
started gum tree out-growers scheme for resettlement and communal area 
farmers seemed to carry the day. The Councillor proposed a compromise deal: 
Border Timbers could proceed with its project provided it build a dam capturing 
storm run-off from the river for the benefit of the downstream irrigators, thus off-
setting the increased upstream water use by the trees. However, the alliance built 
by Border Timbers appeared to be too strong, despite recent presidential 
elections that were won by President Mugabe on the back of promises to address 
the land issue. 
In 1997 Border Timbers began planting 500 hectares of pines on one of the 
farms. Halfway through the year the Mozambican investors decided to pull out 
of the chip board factory joint venture. Towards the end of November, the 
government designated two of the six farms included in the Hangani land deal 
under the Land Acquisition Act. The four remaining farms formed a contiguous 
block located in the rain-shadow of the upper catchment of Nyanyadzi River, and 
were considered unsuitable for exotic tree plantations. 
This case, which is much more complex than presented here, shows how a 
number of actors mobilise networks, selectively drawing on political and 
6
 Long term afforestation studies in Erin and Chisengu (Chimanimani district), where Msasa 
grassland was converted into exotic pine plantations, reduced annual river flow by 26% and 19% 
respectively. Dry season flow, crucial for irrigation, decreased by 42% and 15% respectively 
(Andrews and Bullock, 1994). 
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scientific resources. It is beyond doubt that establishing a plantation of pines and 
gum trees on the under-utilised farms in the upper reaches of the catchment 
would significantly decrease the dry season flow of Nyanyadzi river. Border 
Timbers, however, managed to forge an alliance (both economic and scientific) 
which succeeded in silencing objections made to its plans. Border Timbers 
enrolled two companies that produce Environmental Impact Assessment reports 
indicating that the project would hardly affect the hydrology. It also unveiled a 
plan to develop eco-tourism and wildlife ranching on the farms considered 
unsuitable for commercial timber production. 
Underlying this story line is the land question. After the presidential elections 
in 1996, the government of Zimbabwe geared itself towards a second 
resettlement phase. The white landowner was desperate to sell his farms before 
they were grabbed by the government under the Land Acquisition Act. 
Surprisingly, the land speculator and Border Timbers managed to get a 
declaration of no interest from the government. Objections from the Zimbabwe 
Farmers Union, the Councillor and the University of Zimbabwe researcher were 
brushed aside. The livelihoods of scores of labour tenants and their families were 
sacrificed. However, the final twist in the case showed that a more powerful 
actor-network, a network of high politics, intervened when two of the farms were 
finally designated. 
The politics of plenty: Pungwe water for the city ofMutare 
In 1992, the city of Mutare (130,000 inhabitants) ran out of water. The city 
council instituted stringent measures, such as water rationing, bans on the use of 
hosepipes and the filling of pools. Punitive tariffs were also imposed, backed up 
by awareness campaigns in newspapers and at schools, in a desperate move to 
curb demand. As a result, water consumption dropped to a third of its level for 
the previous year earlier. The city was saved at the eleventh hour by rains that 
replenished the dams from March 1993 onwards. This traumatic experience 
fuelled local politicians, residents and the Department of Water Development to 
search for an additional source of water for the city. The additional amount 
required to quench the thirst of the Mutareans was not an issue that received 
much attention: the capacity of the city's existing water system (20 Mm3/yr) 
simply had to be doubled to cater for it's projected need until the year 2010, by 
which time the its population would have surged to an estimated 300,000 people. 
No questions were raised regarding the demand-side of Mutare's water 
problems. If the city's water need would be based on, say, half the unrestricted 
demand, which was still 50% more than consumption during the year of the great 
drought, the existing system would have sufficed until the year 2010. And what 
if all efforts would be directed towards reducing system losses? Consumption 
could either increase to more acceptable levels, or the quest for new supplies 
could be postponed even further. How much are system losses anyway? Pertinent 
questions such as these were ignored. The city firmly believed that with more 
water available, and given its strategic location along the Beira corridor between 
the Indian Ocean and Harare, the town would attract more businesses and be 
7
 This section is based on unpublished material collected by Pieter van der Zaag. 
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poised for an 'economic boom'. The quest for doubling Mutare's water supply 
had begun. 
Three different supply options presented themselves and one was chosen. This 
option involved taking water from the Pungwe River. 
The advantages of this option were: 
1. The water would gravitate through a 4km tunnel and a 46km pipeline to the 
existing treatment works at Odzani, from where it would further gravitate to 
the city; this option would therefore not require any pumping. 
2. The water drawn from the Pungwe would be pure, hardly requiring 
treatment. 
3. The pipeline would be owned by the city. 
The disadvantages were: 
1. Only some 16 Mm3/yr could be securely drawn from this source, so it fell 
short in providing a supply solution for the coming 15 years. 
2. It would be expensive to build (US$ 100 million, nearly three times the next 
expensive option). 
3. It would create problems with Mozambique, and in particular the city of 
Beira, which depends entirely on Pungwe water. 
4. It would negatively impact on the pristine ecology of the Pungwe catchment, 
located in a popular National Park. 
In arriving at its decision, the City Council appeared to have used two major 
criteria. The first was that it wanted to own the new water system in order to be 
fully in charge of the scheme, and not depend on central government. The second 
was obvious; namely that it would prefer the option that was cheapest to the city. 
The Pungwe alternative, while by far the most expensive in terms of investment, 
had the lowest running cost. If the city would be able to access government loans 
on the usual local authority borrowing terms, the interest rate would be lower 
than the annual inflation rate (-20%) (Zimconsult, 1996). This meant that the 
best option would always be that option with the lowest recurrent operational 
costs, whatever the initial investment. The Pungwe alternative was the only 
option that scored positive on both criteria. 
The City Council now had to solve a number of obstacles to get the pipeline 
constructed. To begin with, the Department of Water Development was in favour 
of another option. It argued that the Pungwe scheme was too expensive and 
would yield little water. Since Mutare would require the department's approval 
for its preferred alternative, it had to make it change its mind. Additionally, the 
Council had to present the preferred option to the Mutareans as the best, if not 
the only way of solving Mutare's water woes, so the residents would forget to ask 
difficult questions, such as how much the Pungwe water would cost. The 
Council would also have to overcome Mozambique's opposition to the Pungwe 
scheme. And finally, it had to find a suitable financing package. 
The City Council managed to overcome these odds within a period of 18 
months, through establishing a fruitful relationship with a Swedish construction 
firm (which backed up the City's preferred option with engineering facts, and 
mobilised support from Sida, the Swedish International Development Agency), 
and by carefully exploiting political opportunities within a faction-ridden 
Manicaland province of the ruling party. But the major feat was that the council 
270 
managed to portray the Pungwe project as providing purity (pristine water), 
security (no more shortages) and prosperity (more business) to its residents, all in 
one. These powerful positive values became synonymous with the Pungwe 
scheme, and most people fell for it. Few still wanted to look into the detailed 
merits and demerits of this option. Once popular support was achieved, the vying 
politicians could do little else than to follow suit. 
One outstanding issue was that a declaration of no objection from the 
government of Mozambique was required before the project could go ahead. 
This was a condition set by donors. The Pungwe River, shared by Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique, is the only fresh water source of the city of Beira (some 500,000 
inhabitants). Tedious negotiations at government level finally resulted in an 
agreement whereby Mutare was allowed to take a maximum of 700 1/s, provided 
that it would always leave a flow of 500 1/s in the river at the point of abstraction. 
Engineers subsequently translated this agreement into a specific design of the 
river off-take. Construction of the Pungwe pipeline started in December 1996, 
was completed in December 1999 and officially opened by President Mugabe in 
March 2000. 
A group of actors had managed to construct a pipeline that some believed was 
the least feasible of several options to solving Mutare's water crisis. The group 
managed to interconnect two river systems, rendering two cities separated by 
geographical distance and national boundaries, interdependent of each other. 
They also managed to enrol highly placed ruling party leaders, who for once set 
aside their differences, and overcame initial opposition from the Department of 
Water Development. Finally, the group managed to interest a Swedish 
engineering company and international and local financing institutions. Around 
the Pungwe, a water-network emerged with a vast span, both geographically and 
politically. The network proved too strong and effective for the voices of dissent. 
Mutare residents were blinded by the Pungwe symbol, and made to forget the 
impending tariff increases. The Mozambican government was made to accept the 
project. Environmentalists were painted as a 'clique of very few individuals' and 
small-scale farmers in Honde Valley, who feared they would be affected by 
Mutare's water abstraction upstream along the Pungwe River, were threatened 
with eviction. Even Sida staff critical about the project did not dare to come out 
in the open. All these voices of dissent, clearly with their own different agendas, 
failed to connect and establish an effective water-network with a global 
resonance. They did not manage to enrol, for instance, concerned environmental 
and other groups in Mozambique, Sweden and elsewhere. 
By the year 2000, the main proponents of the pipeline were extremely pleased. 
The Swedish engineering firm could add another engineering miracle to its 
portfolio (constructed in time, within budget, with minimum environmental 
impact). Standard Bank was proud to have engineered together with Sida an 
innovative financing modality, whereby US$ 5 million of aid money could 
generate another US$ 45 million of local financing from the private sector. (In 
addition, a Nordic financier provided a US$ 50 million concessionary loan to the 
Zimbabwe government.) Sida, for its part, was confident it had helped 'to ensure 
that countries can make their own decisions on their economies and policies and 
create the conditions necessary for national self-determination'. 
African Business, July/August 1999; http://www.africasia.com/ab/jul99/abfn0701.htm 
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The City Council was also pleased, as it managed to get the option it wanted. It 
now owned a pipeline that produced water at very low recurrent cost, and did not 
have to worry too much about the loan repayments, as the interest rates were less 
than the inflation rate. After the inauguration of the pipeline, the city engineer 
closed supply from the old source of water, and exclusively used Pungwe water 
that hardly required any treatment, saving substantial amounts of money. Water 
consumption could now continue to grow, and in October 2000 raw water 
abstraction surpassed the all-time record of January 1991, namely 1.6 
MmVmonth. The council treasurer was happy, because more water delivered 
meant more revenue. And the politicians could look back on a job well done: a 
job that first managed to influence the people in what they perceived their needs 
to be, and subsequently satisfied them. 
The only problem was that the pipe network within the city refused to co-
operate. Pipes kept on leaking and bursting, and more and more water meters 
mysteriously got stuck. It was now pure Pungwe water that was disappearing and 
nobody wanted to know that half of this precious water was going to waste 
(Gumbo and Van der Zaag, 2001). 
Discussion 
Despite their differences, the cases presented here show what is entailed when 
human actors attempt to harness a life-giving water resource. The case studies 
demonstrate, first, that it matters which water source is at focus, and for what 
purpose it is intended to be used: whether it is rainwater for agriculture, river 
flow for irrigation, or pristine river water for a city. Clearly, networks are not 
built for their own sake, but evolve because of the object that has to be 
harnessed. Consequently, the physical object of appropriation influences the 
shape of the water-networks that develop. Harvesting rainwater required a 
network of a limited span, diverting river water for small-scale irrigation 
required a network that spanned the river catchment, while abstracting water for 
a large city from an international river necessarily involved a network that 
ranged across river basins, countries, and even continents. 
Secondly, these cases show that it is not always easy to channel, harvest and 
use water for its intended purpose. It nearly always requires substantial 
investments, whether in monetary terms, labour, knowledge or in social relations. 
All cases presented here required, in fact, all four types of capital. The bench 
terrace was knowledge- and labour-intensive, while Mutambara irrigators had to 
mobilise commerce as well as forge new social relationships to access water. In 
all cases, some institutional regulations were breached or set aside. Some actors 
carefully exploited the fragmented nature of the institutions involved, drawing on 
those that suited them most and ignoring the rest. For some, the complex, 
uncoordinated and fragmented institutional and legal reality thus became a 
resource in itself. 
Thirdly, in all cases there were alternative solutions for an intended water use. 
Biriwiri farmers could have decided to harvest rain somewhere else, where the 
land would be more co-operative. The City of Mutare could have decided to get 
water from the nearby and under-utilised Osborne dam, at a much lower 
investment cost. This option, however, involved high running costs (pumping, 
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water treatment), and would have made the city dependent on the Department of 
Water Development, which owned the dam. The Hangani farms in upper 
Nyanyadzi could have been used for sustained furrow irrigation and wildlife 
ranching by officially re-settled, former labour tenants and squatters, at no 
detriment to downstream water users. Alternatively, Border Timbers could have 
offset the negative flow impact of afforestation on downstream water users by 
constructing a dam. Since such alternatives existed, actors had to enrol other 
actors in their projects, strategically establishing coalitions, and convincing 
others of the benefits of the preferred solution. So landless peasants made Land 
Development Officers accept the bench terraces on land too steep to cultivate. 
The Department of Water Development made a surprise about-turn in the case of 
Mutare. Similarly, the Honde valley farmers were overpowered by threats of 
brute force, and environmentalists were largely ignored. Border Timbers 
mobilised economic and environmental arguments and twisted scientific 
evidence in order to ward off political claims on more land for destitute 
communal area dwellers, and to dismiss the dam option. 
Fourthly, once a preferred solution had been 'stabilised', the physical world 
had to be transformed and made to cooperate: stones were re-aligned in Biriwiri; 
Mutambara irrigation infrastructure was allowed to leak in order to oil water (re-) 
distribution at night; in the Nyanyadzi catchment, furrows were dug at suitable 
locations honouring the local hydro-geological behaviour of water, and 
elsewhere exotic tree plantations were established; at Pungwe the intake structure 
'concretised' an agreement between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 'cementing' 
the connection between two river basins. 
At times, however, the physical world and water's hydrological behaviour 
resisted to comply with the prevalent legal and institutional framework, and 
refused to honour the claims and needs of state and other actors. Thus the post-
independence Water Court administered water-network issued more water rights 
than was available in the Nyanyadzi River, and the river could not honour these 
claims. Irrigators from the Nyanyadzi project could not realise their right to the 
river's water in times when they needed it most. The riverbed did not comply 
with the water sharing arrangement brokered by the District Administrator, and 
river flows disappeared. The informal upstream furrow irrigators argued that the 
little water available could be utilised by them better, as it was otherwise going 
to waste (i. e. consumed by riverine vegetation, percolated to the subsoil, or 
evaporated into the air). So the fair deal collapsed. 
Finally, some of the networks of human and non-human actors that emerged 
were powerful, some of them were durable, and some were both. The water-
network emerging around the Pungwe was powerful: it mobilised US$ 100 
million, it managed to eclipse common sense, and could enrol actors on a global 
scale. The network may not durable but is bound to last, at least in terms of the 
continuous flow of water from the river to Mutare residents, and the flow of 
repayments of the loans incurred. Other water-networks, like the one's 
engineered by Biriwiri dryland farmers and Nyanyadzi furrow irrigators, whilst 
not powerful in the sense of formal legal and institutional backing or spatial 
extent, have proven to be very durable. 
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Conclusion 
Water-networks can be understood and described as an outcome of strategic 
action where actors use whatever is déployable in their bid to secure water. The 
practices of actors featuring in the case studies were largely informed by the 
physical and other (including social and institutional) resources available to 
them. In the water-networks described, essential parts of the social dynamics 
were focussed on, and to certain extents constrained and determined by, material 
things rather than people. Networks of human and non-human actors emerge 
around water use that have a sense of order. The water-networks are recursive, 
emergent forms that enable further action to be taken by some, while 
constraining the options available to others. The central point of the cases is that 
these networks include material elements, which are integral, if not central, parts 
of them. The material context in which human action is enacted is thus a 
constituent element ofthat action. The actor-oriented approach (Long, 1984) has, 
in our view, underplayed the material dimension in social relationships and 
human action. As a result, its contribution to some important academic debates, 
such as those centring on the artificial binaries 'nature-society' and 'actor-
structure', has been disappointing, while its potential relevance to development 
practice has so far been limited. 
If it is true that water-networks have materials as constituent elements, 
changing these networks may pose a real challenge. Zimbabwe at one point 
made the political decision to reform its water sector through changing the water 
law (which abolishes water rights and converts them into permits), and 
establishing new institutions, such as the Catchment Councils. These new legal 
and institutional forms aim at making the availability of water more equitable, its 
use more efficient, while protecting the environment and involving stakeholders 
in the decision-making processes of water allocation and use. These are all 
laudable objectives. However, the question is whether legal and institutional 
changes are sufficient to effect a change in the existing water-networks, and 
whether the actors forming part of these will change their practices and attitudes. 
The physical parts of these networks are most likely to stubbornly remain 
unchanged. Since the material things are intricately interwoven in these 
networks, the actors using the water may find it difficult to adapt their action to 
the new institutional reality, unless they re-adjust the entire assembly of the 
network, including its material parts. Only then can water use practices be 
expected to change substantially. 
The Mutare pipeline case provides a clear example of this. The pipeline seems 
to follow the values enshrined in the old water act, which sought to solve water 
problems in a supply driven, technocratic manner. With the new water act in 
place, the pipe now appears a misfit: since it provides plenty of water at low 
recurrent cost there is little need for the City Council to closely monitor water 
use and attempt to minimise unaccounted-for-water. As a result unaccounted-for-
water has increased to unacceptable levels since the commissioning of the 
pipeline in early 2000 (50% of water diverted from the Pungwe). At the same 
time, water tariffs have increased in order to service the investment loan, 
compromising access to this life-giving resource to the poor. The physical parts 
in this water-network therefore induce practices that lead to inefficiency and 
inequity. 
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If the new legal and institutional forms had been in place, would for instance 
the Mutare and Nyanyadzi cases have resulted in different outcomes? Referring 
to the latter case, one can expect Nyanyadzi river water management and 
development to have been subject to scientific, political, and economic debate in 
a (sub) catchment council with all the stakeholders represented. Would such a 
user institution have succeeded in negotiating a decision that was more 
favourable for small-scale producers, in the face of powerful interests that 
transcend the local polity? And would it have resolved the clash of interest 
between the 'formal' and 'informal' small-scale water users? Merely establishing 
a negotiation platform is most probably not a sufficient condition. It would 
require relations between people and things to be clarified and changed, and 
thereby relations between people. It would often also require that the relations 
between things themselves be changed, so that the assembly of artefacts not only 
better respects the local hydrology but also the new water regulations and the 
catchment-wide water-network as a whole. 
At a more practical level, in the Nyanyadzi catchment the (user) rights to water 
of all water users need to be clarified, in an open and transparent process of 
consultations, thus paying respect to the material reality of the Nyanyadzi water 
front. Simultaneously alternative sources of water could be considered. 
Groundwater remains a potential alternative to a dam for the irrigators in the 
downstream Nyanyadzi project, and requires investigation. If groundwater 
proves to be a feasible alternative, Nyanyadzi project could rescind (part of) its 
claims to river water. Finally, the design of diversion structures, measuring 
devices and furrows need to be evaluated on their effectiveness by technical 
experts, in close consultation with their users/owners. This could be done in a 
manner that would allow easy monitoring by both users and catchment council 
staff, thus calibrating and materialising the discourse of proportional water 
allocation ingrained in the new water Act (WRMS, n.d.; see also Van der Zaag 
and Röling, 1996) with the prevalent practice of issuing and measuring water in 
absolute volumes (as embodied in the prevailing V-notch water measurement 
structures). 
Similarly, the intervention package required in the case of the city of Mutare 
would involve a suit of technical, institutional, financial and other aspects 
(Gumbo and Van der Zaag, 2001). Irrespective of the fact whether Mutare city 
uses Pungwe water or water from other sources, the present leaking distribution 
network begs urgent attention. A demand management strategy combined with 
efforts to upgrade the distribution network, making it water tight and transparent, 
can mitigate Mutare's water woes to a considerable extent (pre- and post-
Pungwe project). Water meters can be repaired, pressure reducing valves at some 
points in the reticulation network installed, a monitoring and water audit system 
established, and the water services provided to some high density areas 
completely overhauled. In addition, the institutional relationships between the 
treasury and engineering departments within the city council can be clarified, the 
flow of information between these departments re-directed and intensified, and 
new city council regulations established to ensure a reasonable and stable 
maintenance budget. Finally, the environment, for which water reservations have 
been made in the new water Act, begs for representation on the newly 
9
 Appadurai (1986); for an application to water-networks see Coward, 1986a, 1986b. 
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established Save Catchment Council. Pristine river valleys, like the Pungwe, do 
not speak up for themselves, despite legal stipulations favouring their cause. 
In both the cases of Nyanyadzi and Mutare we see that holistic intervention 
packages are called for, if Nyanyadzi and Pungwe waters are to be used 
equitably, sustainably and efficiently. 
In conclusion, a symmetrical treatment of human and non-human actors in the 
actor-oriented approach has the potential not only to productively engage in 
some of the important sociological debates, but also to increase the relevance of 
sociology to the development practice. In addition, such an actor-actant approach 
would be an open invitation for the non-social scientist to join in, something we 
would gladly accept. 
References 
Alexander, J., 1993, The state, agrarian policy and rural politics in Zimbabwe: case studies oflnsiza 
and Chimanimani districts, 1940-1990. Oxford: Oxford University. D.Phil. Thesis, 
Anderson, D., 1984, Depression, dust bowl, demography, and drought: the colonial state and soil 
conservation in East Africa during the 1930s, in: African Affairs 83: 321-343 
Andersson, J.A., 1999, The politics of land scarcity: land disputes in Save Communal Area, 
Zimbabwe, in: Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 25 (4): 553-578 
Andersson, J.A., 2001a, Re-interpreting the rural-urban connection; migration practices and socio-
culturel dispositions of Buhera workers in Harare, in: Africa, vol. 71 (1): 82-112 
Andersson, J.A., 2001b, Administrators' knowledge and state control in colonial Zimbabwe; the 
invention of the rural-urban divide in Buhera district, 1912-80, in: Journal of African History, vol. 42 
Andrews, A.J. and A. Bullock, 1994, Hydrological impact of afforestation in Eastern Zimbabwe. 
Wallingford: Institute of Hydrology 
Appadurai, A., 1986, Introduction: commodities and the politics of value. In: The social life of 
things; commodities in cultural perspective. Cambridge: ambridge University Press. Pp.3-63 
Beinart, W., 1984, Soil erosion, conservationism, and ideas about development in Southern Africa, 
in: Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 11 (2): 52-83 
Bolding, A., 1999, Caught in the catchment; past, present and future of Nyanyadzi water 
management, in Manzungu, E. A. Senzanje and P. van der Zaag (eds.), Water for agriculture in 
Zimbabwe; policy and management options for the smallholder sector. Harare: University of 
Zimbabwe Publications. Pp. 123-152 
Bolding, A., E. Manzungu and P. van der Zaag, 1996, Farmer-initiated irrigation furrows; 
observations from the Eastern Highlands, in: Manzungu, E. and P. van der Zaag (eds.), The practice 
of smallholder irrigation; case studies from Zimbabwe. Harare: University of Zimbabwe 
Publications. Pp.191-218 
Bolding, A., E. Manzungu and C. Zawe, 2001a, Irrigation policy discourse and practice: two cases of 
irrigation management transfer in Zimbabwe, in: Mollinga, P. and A. Bolding (eds.), The politics of 
irrigation reforms. New Dehli: Sage Publishers 
Bolding, A., J. Mutimba and P. van der Zaag (eds.), 2001b, Agricultural intervention in Zimbabwe; 
new perspectives on extension. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications 
Callon, M., 1986, Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of scallops and the 
fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in: Law, J. (ed.), Power, action and belief: a new sociology of 
knowledge? Sociological Review Monograph 32, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pp. 196-233 
276 
Gallon, M., 1987, Society in the making: the study of technology as a tool for sociological analysis, 
in: Bijker, W. E., P. Hughes and T.J. Pinch (eds.), The social construction of technical systems: new 
directions in the sociology and history of technology. Cambridge (Mass):MIT Press. Pp. 83-103 
Callon, M., and B. Latour, 1981, Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how actors macrostructure reality 
and how sociologists help them to do so, in: Knorr-Cetina, K.D. and A.V. Cicourel (cds.), Advances 
in social theoty and methodology: toward an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies. Boston: 
Routlcdge and Kegan Paul. Pp. 277-303 
Campbell, B.M., R.F. Du Toit and C.A.M. Attwell, 1989, The Save study; relationships between the 
environment and basic needs satisfaction in the Save catchment, Zimbabwe. Harare: University of 
Zimbabwe Publications 
Coward Jr., W.E., 1986a, State and locality in Asian irrigation development: the property factor, in: 
Nobe, K. C. and R. K. Sampath (eds.), Irrigation management in developing countries: current issues 
and approaches. Boulder and London: Westview Press. Studies in water policy and management no. 
8. Pp. 491-508 
Coward Jr., W.E., 1986b, Direct or indirect alternatives for irrigation investment and the creation of 
property, in: William Easter, K. (ed.), Irrigation investment, technology, and management strategies 
for development. Boulder and London: Westview Press. Studies in water policy and management 
no.9. Pp. 225-244 
Gumbo, B., and P. van der Zaag, 2001, Water losses and the political constraints to demand 
management; the case of the City of Mutare, Zimbabwe. Paper prepared for the 2nd 
WARFSA/WaterNet Symposium 'Integrated Water Resources Management: Theory, Practice, 
Cases'; Cape Town, 30 and 31 October 
Kortelainen, J., 1999, The river as an actor-network: the Finnish forest industry utilization of lake and 
river systems, in: Geoforum, vol. 30: 235-247 
Latour, B., 1987, Science in action: how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press 
Latour, B., 1991, Technology is society made durable. In J. Law (ed.), A sociology of monsters? 
Essays on power, technology and domination, Sociological Review Monograph 38, London: 
Routledge. Pp. 103-131 
Law, J., 1994, Organising modernity. Oxford: Blackwell 
Law, J. and W.E. Bijker, 1992, Technology, stability and social theory, in: Bijker, W.E. and J. Law 
(eds.), Shaping technology - building society: studies in socio-technical change, Cambridge (Mass): 
MIT Press. Pp. 290-308 
Long, N., 1984, Creating space for change, a perspective on the sociology of development, in: 
Sociologia Ruralis vol. 24 (3-4): 168-184 
Long, N. (ed.), 1989, Encounters at the interface: a perspective on social discontinuities in rural 
development. Wageningen: Wageningen Agricultural University 
Long, N., 1990, From paradigm lost to paradigm regained? The case for an actor-oriented sociology 
of development. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 49 (3): 3-32 
Long, N., 1992, From paradigm lost to paradigm regained? The case for an actor-oriented sociology 
of development, in: Long, N. and A. Long (eds.), Battlefields of knowledge: the interlocking of theory 
and practice in social research and development. London: Routledge. Pp 16-43 
Long, N., and J. D. van der Ploeg, 1989, Demythologizing planned intervention: an actor perspective. 
Sociologia Ruralis, vol. 29 (3/4): 226-249 
Long, N., and J.D. van der Ploeg, 1994, Heterogeneity, actor and structure, in: Booth, D. (ed.), 
Rethinking Social Development. Burnt Mill: Longman. Pp.62-89 
Long, N., and J.D. van der Ploeg, 1995, Reflections on agency, ordering the future and planning, in: 
Frerks, G. and J. den Ouden (eds.), In search of the middle ground. Essays on the sociology of 
planned development. Wageningen: Wageningen Agricultural University. Pp. 64-79 
277 
Magadlela, D., 1997, A smoky affair: challenges facing some small-holder burley tobacco producers 
in Zimbabwe, in: Zambezia, vol. 24 ( 1 ): 13-30 
Magadlela, D., 2000, Irrigating lives; development intervention and dynamics of social relationships 
in an irrigation project. Wageningen: Wageningen Agricultural University. PhD thesis 
Magadlela, D., and P. Hebinck, 1995, Dry fields and spirits in trees - a social analysis of irrigation 
intervention in Nyamaropa communal area, in: Zambezia, vol. 22, (1): 43-62 
Manzungu, E., 1995, Engineering or Domineering? The Politics of Water Control in Mutambara 
Irrigation Scheme, Zimbabwe, in: Zambezia vol. 22 (2): 115-136 
Manzungu, E., 1999a, Conflict management crisis in the Umvumvumvu catchment, eastern 
Zimbabwe, in: Manzungu, E., A. Senzanje and P. van der Zaag (eds.), Water for agriculture in 
Zimbabwe; policy and management options for the smallholder sector. Harare: University of 
Zimbabwe Publications. Pp. 179-193 
Manzungu, E., 1999b, Strategies of smallholder irrigation management in Zimbabwe. Wageningen: 
Wageningen Agricultural University. PhD thesis 
Manzungu, E., 2001, A lost opportunity: the case of the water reform debate in the fourth parliament 
of Zimbabwe, in: Zambezia, vol. 28, (1): 97-120 
Manzungu, E., A. Senzanje and P. van der Zaag (eds.), 1999, Water for agriculture in Zimbabwe; 
policy and management options for the smallholder sector. Harare: University of Zimbabwe 
Publications 
Manzungu E., and P. van der Zaag, (eds.), 1996, The practice of smallholder irrigation; case studies 
from Zimbabwe. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 
Mutimba, J., 1997, Farmer participatory research: an analysis of resource-poor farmer involvement 
in, and contribution to, the agricultural research process in Zimbabwe. Harare: University of 
Zimbabwe. PhD Dissertation 
North, D., 1990, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Ostrom, E., 1992, Crafting institutions for self governing irrigation systems. San Francisco: Institute 
of Contemporary Studies Press 
Roder, W., 1965, The Sabi Valley irrigation projects. Dept. of Geography Research Paper No. 99. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Roe, Emery M., 1995, More than the politics of decentralization: local government reform, district 
development and public administration in Zimbabwe, in: World Development, vol. 23 (5): 833-843 
Rukuni, M., 1988, The evolution if smallholder policy in Zimbabwe: 1928-1986, in: Irrigation and 
Drainage Systems, vol. 2: 199-210 
Van der Zaag, P., 2001, The bench terrace between invention and intervention: Physical and political 
aspects of a conservation technology, in: Bolding, A., J. Mutimba and P. van der Zaag (eds.), 
Interventions in smallholder agriculture; implications for extension in Zimbabwe. Harare: University 
of Zimbabwe Publications. Pp. 184-205 
Van der Zaag, P., and N. Roling, 1996, The water acts in the Nyachowa catchment area, in: 
Manzungu, E. and P. van der Zaag (eds.), The practice of smallholder irrigation; case studies from 
Zimbabwe. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications. Pp. 161-190 
Vijfhuizen, C, 1997, Rain-making, political conflicts and gender images: a case from Mutema 
chieftaincy in Zimbabwe, in: Zambezia, vol. 24 (1): 31-49 
Vijfhuizen, C, 1998, 'The people you live with'; gender identities and social practices, beliefs and 
power in the livelihoods of Ndau women and men in a village with an irrigation scheme in 
Zimbabwe. Wageningen: Wageningen Agricultural University. PhD thesis 
Vijfhuizen, C, and L. Makora, 1998, More than one paramount chief in one chieftaincy? The gender 
of maintaining worlds, in: Zambezia, vol. 25, (1): 59-81 
278 
Wanmali, Sudhir, 1992, Patterns of household consumption and production in Gazaland District, in: 
Wanmali, S. and J.M. Zamchiya (eds.), Service provision and its impact on agricultural and rural 
development in Zimbabwe: a case study of Gazaland district. Washington D.C.: Dept of Physical 
Planning, GoZ/IFPRI. Pp. 90-150 
Wiskapu, E., 2001, An assessment of the variation in the viability of tomato production under contract 
farming: a case of Mutambara irrigation scheme. Harare: University of Zimbabwe, BSc Agriculture 
Hons. Thesis 
WRMS, n.d.. Towards integrated water reso8rces management: water resources management strategy. 
Harare: Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development 
Zimconsult, 1996, Water pricing options and implications: final report (main volume). Harare: 
Ministry of Water Development and Rural Resources. WRMS 
279 
